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# THE KREMLIN PLAYBOOK 2

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## Case Study

# Montenegro

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Of the six case study countries assessed in this report, Montenegro is the most visible and recent victim of high-risk, high-profile Russian malign influence. The Western Balkans country, with its strategic coastline on the Adriatic Sea, was the stage of an attempted coup—allegedly backed by Russian intelligence and Serbian operatives—on the eve of elections in October 2016 and ahead of its NATO accession.<sup>1</sup> Montenegro’s long-standing relationship with Russia dates back to the nineteenth century when the Russian Empire presented itself as the defender of the people of Montenegro from the Ottoman Empire. Ties frayed between the Soviet Union and Communist Yugoslavia (of which Montenegro was a constituent republic) at the beginning of the Cold War when Yugoslavia refused to accept the Soviet Union’s supreme authority over all communist nations. Despite improved relations after Stalin’s death in 1953, Yugoslavia kept its distance and retained an independent foreign policy from the USSR. After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until Montenegro’s independence vote in 2006.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout this turbulent history, the political and cultural forces of pan-Slavism along with a common Christian orthodox faith have united Russian and Balkan communities, serving the Kremlin’s interest in its posturing as the historical defender of all Slavic peoples. Ethnic Serbs in Montenegro, who represent close to 30 percent of the population, remain inspired by the mythological vision of a Greater Serbia that would unite all ethnic Serbs under Russia’s protection.<sup>3</sup> Russia also has a larger economic footprint in Montenegro than all other Central and Eastern European case study countries. Montenegro’s NATO accession—and its broader pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration—severs that historical narrative and instead gives Slavic peoples freedom to join the West, thwarting Moscow’s ambitions in the region and prompting its rebuke.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, despite becoming a member of NATO in 2016 and being on a rapid path toward EU accession since 2010, Montenegro’s overall democracy score and the inde-

- 1 Dusica Tomovic, “Investigation Uncovers Second Russian Montenegro Coup Suspect,” *Balkan Insight*, November 22, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/media-investigation-identifies-montenegro-coup-suspect-11-22-2018>.
- 2 Reuf Bajrovic, Vesko Garcevic, and Richard Kraemer, “Hanging by a Thread: Russia’s Strategy of Destabilization in Montenegro,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, July 3, 2018, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/07/hanging-by-a-thread-russias-strategy-of-destabilization-in-montenegro/>.
- 3 “Census 2011 data – Montenegro,” *MONSTAT*, <http://www.monstat.org/eng/page.php?id=393&pageid=57>.
- 4 Dusica Tomovic, “Serbian Church Urges Montenegro NATO Referendum,” *Balkan Insight*, January 5, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbian-church-urges-montenegro-to-hold-referendum-on-nato-01-04-2016>; See also: “Rogozin: Crna Gora će zažaliti zbog odluke da pristupi u NATO,” *Vijesti*, January 12, 2016, <http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/rogozin-crna-gora-ce-zazaliti-zbog-odluke-da-pristupi-u-nato-869751> (cache-based source).

pendence of its media have worsened since its independence in 2006.<sup>5</sup> Anti-corruption efforts have stagnated in the past 10 years.<sup>6</sup> Although there have been some cases of successful prosecution of corruption and non-transparent acquisitions, Montenegro ranks lower than Romania in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index,<sup>7</sup> and its governance standards have barely improved in the past decade.<sup>8</sup> Investigative resources are insufficient and institutions are weak.<sup>9</sup> For example, the Parliament voted in July 2018 to dismiss a member of the council that oversees the anti-corruption agency on allegations of conflict of interest, but the member leads an anti-corruption NGO that has reported on activities of political figures.<sup>10</sup>

Newer programs also affect the financial and national security of the country: in 2018, Montenegro officially launched its "Citizenship by Investment" program, which will allow foreigners making an investment of at least €500,000 to obtain citizenship for themselves and their family (similar to programs in EU member states Cyprus and Hungary).<sup>11</sup> The European Union has recently voiced concerns over this type of so-called golden visa scheme, as it allows potentially malign-intentioned investors or illicit actors to "Europeanize" their investments, hide assets, or launder money through the investment.<sup>12</sup> The high level of Russian investments in Montenegro is likely to produce an inflow of passport seekers, putting additional strains on the weak Montenegrin security system.

Montenegro's political scene is ruled by a small circle of actors who have been in power for decades. The Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro has been in power since before independence, with its leader Milo Dukanovic assuming either the presidency or premiership of Montenegro for 28 years despite his support for Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic orientation.<sup>13</sup> This concentration and his prolonged hold on power led to

- 5 Bojan Baća and Kenneth Morrison, *Nations in Transit 2018, Montenegro – Country Profile* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 2018), <https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/montenegro>.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 "Montenegro," Transparency International, <https://www.transparency.org/country/MNE>.
- 8 Baća and Morrison, *Nations in Transit*.
- 9 Southeast European for Development and Integrity, *Shadow Power: Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe* (Sofia, Bulgaria: Southeast European for Development and Integrity, 2016), <http://seldi.net/publications/publications/shadow-power-assessment-of-corruption-and-hidden-economy-in-southeast-europe/>.
- 10 "Montenegro's parliament dismisses anti-corruption leader," bne Intellinews, July 8, 2018, <http://www.intellinews.com/montenegro-s-parliament-dismisses-anti-corruption-leader-144793/>.
- 11 "Montenegro to Launch New Citizenship-by-Investment Program in October," Business Wire, July 27, 2018, <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180727005120/en/Montenegro-Launch-New-Citizenship-by-Investment-Program-October>.
- 12 Michael Peel and Mehreen Khan, "EU states warned over billions banked through 'golden visa' schemes," *Financial Times*, October 10, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/3084f63a-cc5e-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956>.
- 13 Alan Crosby, "Montenegro's Djukanovic Declares Victory In Presidential Election," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 16, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/djukanovic-looks-to-extend-dominance-in-montenegro-s-presidential-vote/29167866.html>.

Mr. Dukanovic being nominated as the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project's (OCCRP) Person of the Year in 2015 "for his work in creating an oppressive political atmosphere and an economy choked by corruption and money laundering."<sup>14</sup> The OCCRP Person of the Year for the prior year was Vladimir Putin.

Beyond its longstanding cultural and historical links with Russia, Montenegro has the highest percentage of Russian foreign direct investments (FDI) and the smallest economy among the report's case study countries, with a GDP of \$4.77 billion in 2017 and a population of little over 622,000. In 2016, Russian FDI represented just over 30 percent of Montenegrin GDP and 13 percent of all inward FDI, and Russia was the largest single investor in the country. Following Montenegro's declaration of independence in 2006, Moscow's corporate footprint (the share of Russian-controlled companies' revenues out of the total turnover in the economy) decreased dramatically from 29 percent in 2006 to 5.5 percent in 2015 due to the pull-out of Oleg Deripaska from the country's largest company, the Podgorica Aluminum Plant (KAP).

But investments originating from Russia have increased since 2006, with the amount never dropping below 10 percent of total FDI. Russian investments in the services sector, principally tourism, have grown substantially. Moreover, Russian companies continue to benefit from a tax structure that allows foreign companies to repatriate profits and dividends without restrictions. In 2016, 32 percent of foreign companies in Montenegro were owned by Russian nationals.<sup>15</sup> Russian investors also participated in non-transparent privatizations of state-owned enterprises in the mid-2000s (after independence), principally in the aluminum and tourism sectors (hotel acquisitions). The state provided important subsidies for these privatizations but sometimes failed to enforce the conditions laid out in privatization and investment agreements (some of which were never fulfilled), potentially allowing Russian investors to pocket the state subsidy.<sup>16</sup>

The most visible and consequential Russian acquisition was in the metal industry when Russian businessman Oleg Deripaska's Central European Aluminum Company (CEAC) acquired the KAP in 2005. The agreement required Deripaska's company to repay the plant's legacy debt (tens of millions of euros) and it would receive preferential terms for electricity prices until 2010. At the time, KAP was Montenegro's largest firm, accounting for 15 percent of its GDP and employing over 2,000 people. As the preferential deal for electricity supply was coming to an end, Deripaska tried and failed to extend the agreement. He then attempted to buy the thermal power plant that was supplying KAP, thus controlling the entire power supply chain to reduce energy cost. This acquisition was blocked by Parliament in 2007 after both ruling and opposition MPs objected, un-

14 "2015 Man of the Year in Organized Crime, Milo Djukanovic," Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 2015, <https://www.occrp.org/personoftheyear/2015/>.

15 Dusica Tomovic, "Russians Dominate Foreign Ownership of Montenegrin Companies," Balkan Insight, August 17, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russians-own-every-third-company-in-montenegro-report-08-17-2016>.

16 Center for the Study of Democracy, *Russian Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans. Corruption and State Capture Risks* (Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2018).

derstanding the risk it entailed for the independence of strategic resources and hence the country itself.<sup>17</sup>

The 2008 economic crisis deeply affected the global aluminum business, and in 2010 Montenegro reclaimed a part of KAP with certain conditions. It still provided the plant with state loan guarantees amounting to €135 million as well as debt forgiveness.<sup>18</sup> Despite this intervention, and due to huge financial losses, KAP was unable to honor its debts to creditors and initiated a bankruptcy procedure in 2013. Deripaska's CEAC then initiated arbitration against Montenegro, demanding compensation for hundreds of millions of euros (compared to a GDP of €4.2 billion in 2014).<sup>19</sup> CEAC has lost two arbitration cases but has opened a third case in Cyprus. In the meantime, KAP was sold to Montenegrin metal company Uniprom for €28 million.<sup>20</sup> But the human, financial and strategic impacts are significant: the plant has lost three-quarters of its employees since privatization, and the lawsuit could bankrupt the government. This exposes the dangers of dubious acquisitions that siphon off state resources in subsidies without sufficient investments, and the failure of the state to protect strategic sectors from becoming dependent on a sole investor.

Unlike other countries in the region, Montenegro's energy sector is not the locus of Russian investments, which are limited to the fuel distribution market. The most visible Russian investment in energy has been Lukoil's acquisition of Roksped, a fuel distribution company, in 2008 for €26.5 million.<sup>21</sup> Prior to this, Lukoil Montenegro (a subsidiary) had invested around €56 million in the country.<sup>22</sup> The Russian private company Novatek and Italy's ENI formed a joint venture that in 2016 received a 30-year exploration concession for Montenegro's exclusive economic zone in the Adriatic Sea.<sup>23</sup> The Italian-Russian energy consortium began seismic explorations studies in November 2018.

The focus of new Russian investments in Montenegro has been in real estate and tourism, where Russia holds leverage over local revenue sources. The state has received nearly €25 million in sales taxes since 2006 from the real estate sector, with an estimated 70,000

17 "DPS izgubio bitku ali se ne predaje," *ND Vijesti*, June 13, 2007.

18 Kenneth Rapoza, "This Crazy Country Is Picking A Fight With A Billionaire Worth 80% Of Its GDP," *Forbes*, November 29, 2015, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/11/29/this-country-picking-fight-with-a-russian-billionaire-who-is-worth-80-of-its-gdp/#6181f34574c8>.

19 Dusica Tomovic, "Russian Tycoon Sues Montenegro Over Aluminum Plant," *Balkan Insight*, November 15, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russian-tycoon-sues-montenegro-over-aluminum-plant-loses-11-15-2016>.

20 Dusica Tomovic, "Montenegro Sells Bankrupt Aluminum Plant," *Balkan Insight*, June 11, 2014, <https://balkaninsight.com/2014/06/11/montenegro-s-bankrupt-aluminium-plant-sold-to-a-local-company/>.

21 "Russians Buy Montenegro Petrol Stations," *Balkan Insight*, April 2, 2008, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russians-buy-montenegro-petrol-stations>.

22 "Lukoil is targeting 15 % fuel market share – Montenegro," *Balkan Energy*, October 31, 2016, <http://balkanenergy.com/lukoil-is-targeting-15-fuel-market-share-montenegro-31-october-2016>.

23 Jessica Resnick-Ault, "Oil dips despite steep draw in U.S. crude stocks," *Reuters*, August 16, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-oil-contract-idUSKCN11K2DS>.

properties belonging to Russian owners—compared to an estimated 7,000 permanent residents from Russia in Montenegro (though this number differs depending on the source).<sup>24</sup> Post-independence privatizations also concentrated on the real estate sector, with Russian businessmen acquiring valuable hotels in attractive locations at only a fraction of their market value. In several cases, as with industrial plants, the privatization agreements were not fully implemented and there was little action by the state to hold the owners accountable. Some of the most valuable hotels were acquired through shell companies.<sup>25</sup>

In other cases, valuable state-owned lands were initially sold for below market price, only to resurface in a later sale at much higher prices, costing the government millions in lost revenue.<sup>26</sup> In one case, an old military complex was sold for €2.35 million, while the land was later resold for €41.7 million; this deal involved Russian-owned companies registered in Montenegro and offshore-registered companies belonging to Montenegrin businessmen.<sup>27</sup> It should be noted that the real estate sector has seen some successful prosecution of corruption cases, leading to the criminal conviction of public officials for abuse of office and damage to the budget.<sup>28</sup>

Tourism has grown in recent years to represent 20 percent of Montenegro's GDP and 54 percent of exports of goods and services.<sup>29</sup> The number of Russian tourists has significantly increased since 2006, growing five-fold to reach 316,000 visits in 2016. An estimate based on nightly accommodation prices shows Russian tourists spent around €225 million on accommodation in 2016, or 5 percent of GDP.<sup>30</sup> Given that Russians represent the largest group of tourists visiting Montenegro and tourism makes up one-fifth of the Montenegrin economy, this is a sector of great leverage for Moscow. Since 2014, Russian-Montenegrin relations have soured due to Montenegro's adoption of Western sanctions against Russia and its NATO accession; this prompted the Kremlin to discourage its citizens to travel to Montenegro. In 2017, it launched a negative media campaign that described Montenegro as dangerous, and portrayed the country as having rising

24 “Nesterenko: U Crnoj Gori živi do sedam hiljada Rusa,” *Vijesti.me*, January 27, 2014, <http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/nesterenko-u-crnoj-gori-zivi-do-sedam-hiljada-rusa-174290> (cache-based source).

25 Center for the Study of Democracy, *Assessing Russia's Economic Footprint in Montenegro* (Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2018).

26 “Prodajom Skočičevojke država oštećena za desetine miliona,” *Vijesti.me*, July 7, 2012, <http://www.vijesti.me/ekonomija/prodajom-skocidjevojke-drzava-ostecena-za-desetine-miliona-82917> (cache-based source).

27 Ibid. In this particular deal, companies registered in Cyprus were involved and after the last buyer failed to pay back the loan used to purchase the property, it was ultimately purchased by none other than Meinl Bank AG.

28 “Zavala: Cape Corruption,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, June 11, 2012, <https://www.reportingproject.net/firstbank/en/zavala-cape-corruption>.

29 “Predrag JELUŠIĆ: Turizam daje petinu BDP-a i čini više od polovine izvoza Crne Gore,” *Portal Analitika*, September 27, 2015, <http://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/203071/predrag-jelusic-turizam-daje-petinu-bdp-a-i-cini-vise-od-polovine-izvoza-crne-gore>.

30 The estimate is based on the average revenue per room rate. See *Horwath Hotel Industry Survey Montenegro 2014*, Horwath Consulting Zagreb (Zagreb, 2014).

crime rates and filthy beaches.<sup>31</sup> The number of tourists from Russia decreased by 62 percent year-on-year.<sup>32</sup> The increasing importance of tourism for Montenegro's economy allowed the Kremlin to weaponize misinformation and affect tourism flows, thus crippling Montenegro's economy.

The Kremlin also retains cultural and societal leverage through the Orthodox Church. A large majority of Montenegrins are Christian Orthodox, and the country's religious authorities (the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral) are still ecumenically attached to the Serbian Orthodox Church. There is a Montenegrin Orthodox Church that has declared autocephaly (similar to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church), but it has not been recognized by Eastern Orthodox Churches.<sup>33</sup> The Kremlin effectively uses the Orthodox Church to voice its opposition to Montenegro's foreign policy decisions. For example, in 2016 Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church publicly voiced concern over the country's NATO accession.<sup>34</sup> Many ethnic Serbs in Montenegro remain staunchly Orthodox and thus a resource to exploit in support of the Kremlin's interests through pan-Slavic, pan-Orthodox appeals. The Serbian patriarch has also served as a conduit for Russian influence in Montenegro; for example, on one of his recent visits to Montenegro, he was escorted by the infamous pro-Putin bikers' club Night Wolves.<sup>35</sup>

Russia's focus on Montenegro aimed to prevent the loss of the last section of Adriatic coastline not held by NATO—to no avail as Montenegro ultimately joined the alliance. Montenegro had already declined Russia's request in 2013 to use its deep-water ports of Bar and Kotor for the temporary moorage of warships (giving the fleet easy access to the Eastern Mediterranean).<sup>36</sup> The Russian government, through the voice of then-deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin, went as far as to say Montenegro would

- 31 "Криминал, минные поля и столбняк: почему Черногория становится опасной для туристов," TV Zvezda, March 25, 2017, [https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane\\_i\\_mire/content/201703251100-mpeq.htm](https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201703251100-mpeq.htm); See also: "Альянс наготове: Черногория в одном шаге от вступления в НАТО," TV Russia1, March 28, 2017, <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2871302>; See also: "Захарова: МИД РФ рекомендует россиянам дважды подумать, прежде чем ехать в Черногорию," Tass.ru, May 29, 2017, <http://tass.ru/politika/4291514>.
- 32 "Tourist numbers up in Montenegro but Russians stay away," bne Intellinews, July 31, 2017, <http://www.intellinews.com/tourist-numbers-up-in-montenegro-but-russians-stay-away-126383/>.
- 33 "Politicko Javno Mnjenje Crne Gore," CEDEM, October 2009, [https://web.archive.org/web/20110722171733/http://www.cedem.me/fajlovi/editor\\_fajlovi/istrazivanja/CEDEM\\_okto-bar09.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20110722171733/http://www.cedem.me/fajlovi/editor_fajlovi/istrazivanja/CEDEM_okto-bar09.pdf).
- 34 Dusica Tomovic, "Serbian Church Urges Montenegro NATO Referendum," Balkan Insight, January 5, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbian-church-urges-montenegro-to-hold-referendum-on-nato-01-04-2016>.
- 35 Filip Rudic and Dusica Tomovic, "Montenegro Detains Pro-Putin Bikers Escorting Serbian Patriarch," Balkan Insight, October 16, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/montenegro-detains-pro-putin-bikers-escorting-serbian-patriarch-10-16-2018>.
- 36 "Montenegro refuses Russian request to use port of Bar for military purposes," *MediTelegraph*, December 20, 2013, <http://www.themediatelegraph.com/en/transport/ports/2013/12/20/montenegro-refuses-russian-request-use-port-bar-for-military-purposes-VoWWWwhslw6MuujizwzMj3K/index.html>.

come to regret its decision to join the alliance.<sup>37</sup> And the Kremlin tried to make sure Montenegro would do just that—by reportedly helping foment a coup before NATO members ratified Montenegro’s membership.

The day before the parliamentary elections of October 16, 2016, Podgorica police arrested a former Serbian gendarmerie commander and 19 other individuals based on the suspicion (and inside information they had received) that they were planning to overthrow the government and murder the prime minister. Serbian nationals were involved, as well as, according to Montenegrin officials, FSB and GRU operatives.<sup>38</sup> The plan was for the individuals to don stolen Montenegrin police uniforms to occupy the parliament on the night of the election, during which the opposition party Democratic Front (DF), a coalition of ethnic Serb and pro-Russian parties, would declare victory and mobilize its voters to storm the parliament. The disguised individuals would fire on the protesters to make it appear that Montenegrin police were trying to prevent the (fictitious) victory of DF, hoping it would trigger violence and chaos across the country. At the same time, there was a plan to assassinate then-prime minister Dukanovic.<sup>39</sup> The plan was only thwarted thanks to a former police officer who confessed to the scheme just days before its planned implementation. A few days later, Serbian Prime Minister Vucic confirmed law enforcement had arrested people in connection to the attempted coup, providing support to the theory that third country individuals were involved.<sup>40</sup> Notably, the Serbian Orthodox Church reportedly hosted a meeting of the instigators of the failed coup in a monastery in 2016 before the elections.<sup>41</sup>

Prosecution for the attempted coup is ongoing. An indictment in the case has charged 14 individuals, including two Russian nationals.<sup>42</sup> The Kremlin has denied any involvement in the coup attempt,<sup>43</sup> as have DF party officials and extremist Serb nationalist groups, some members of which have fought in eastern Ukraine.<sup>44</sup> DF officials are also under investigation in a case of money-laundering concerning the 2016 campaign: the party allegedly used funds of criminal origin wired from Russia through offshore

37 “Rogozin: Crna Gora će zažaliti zbog odluke da pristupi u NATO,” *Vijesti*.

38 Bajrovic et al., “Hanging by a Thread.”

39 Damir Marusic, “Did Russia Botch a Coup in Montenegro?” *American Interest*, October 30, 2016, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/30/did-moscow-botch-a-coup-in-montenegro/>.

40 Milivoje Pantovic, “Vucic: Serbia Arrests People Involved in ‘Illegal Acts’ in Montenegro,” *Balkan Insight*, October 25, 2016, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbian-pm-failed-to-explain-coup-in-montenegro-10-24-2016>.

41 Bajrovic et al., “Hanging by a Thread.”

42 Tomovic, “Investigation Uncovers Second Russian.”

43 Maria Tsvetkova and Vladimir Soldatkin, “Kremlin denies involvement in alleged plot against Montenegro’s PM,” *Reuters*, November 7, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-montenegro-election-idUSKBN132170>.

44 “I am a Serb nationalist, they told me that the authorities in Montenegro should be taken down,” *Telegraf*, October 26, 2017, <http://www.telegraf.rs/english/2906860-i-am-a-serb-nationalist-they-told-me-that-the-authorities-in-montenegro-should-be-taken-down-sindjelic-spoke-at-the-trial-of-the-terrorist-attempt-on-the-election-day>.

accounts which ultimately ended up in the party's coffers after an elaborate scheme through small individual donations.<sup>45</sup>

Montenegro is a classic example of the unvirtuous circle of Russian malign influence. Especially in a very small economy, Russia can concentrate its economic influence in the sectors that have the most influence over the country, and those that are the most important source of economic growth (e.g., tourism). If the Kremlin cannot alter the country's policy orientation through economic means, it can use cultural tools and influence networks from both within (a sympathetic ethnic Serbian population) and outside Montenegro (intelligence and criminal networks in the region) to bring about change to the country's orientation or to fray ties in the transatlantic community. This is exactly the risk to which the leaders of Central and Eastern Europe so presciently alerted the U.S. government a decade ago, and it nearly came to pass in Montenegro.

45 "Money laundering probe into Montenegro's pro-Russian Democratic Front extended," bne IntelliNews, August 31, 2017, <http://www.intellinews.com/money-laundering-probe-into-montenegro-s-pro-russian-democratic-front-extended-128143/>.