Monitoring Corruption and Anticorruption in Southeast Europe
Results and Perspectives

Countering Corruption and State Capture in Southeast Europe
29–30 September 2016
Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
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Structure of the Corruption Monitoring System

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- Corruption pressure
  - Involvement in corruption

Attitude-based corruption indexes
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- Acceptance (tolerance) of corruption
- Susceptibility to corruption

Assessments of the corruption environment indexes
- Likelihood of corruption pressure
- Corruptness of officials
- Feasibility of policy responses to corruption
Corruption pressure and involvement in corruption (2016)

% of the population 18+ who have been asked to give and have given a bribe (money favour, gift) in the last year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pressure (have been asked for a bribe)</th>
<th>Involvement (have given a bribe)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corruption Dynamics: Difference 2016 - 2014, %

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016

- Albania
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Kosovo
- Macedonia
- Montenegro
- Serbia
- Turkey

Perceived likelihood of corruption pressure
Susceptibility to corruption
Corruption pressure
Involvement in corruption

WORSE
BETTER
Experience with corruption

- All indexes are based on population surveys, conducted in each of the SELDI countries with at least 1000 respondents, representative samples and identical methodology which allows cross-country comparisons.

- **Experience** based corruption indexes are built upon victimization-like questions which reflect actual experiences – being asked for a bribe (Corruption pressure) or/and giving one (Involvement in corruption).

- **Corruption pressure** is the main indicator not only for the levels of administrative corruption in a country, but for the overall corruption environment in a country.

- Corruption pressure is highly correlated with actual transactions (Involvement in corruption). It is the preferred indicator from the two experience based indicators.
Corruption pressure, % (2014 and 2016)

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Corruption Pressure Bulgaria 1999 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)
Corruption Pressure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 - 2016

% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)

- 2001: 41%
- 2002: 49%
- 2011: 59%
- 2014: 23%
- 2016: 33%
% of the population 18+, who have extended an informal payment or have been asked to make an informal payment (money, gift, favour)

- 2001: 29.2%
- 2002: 42.3%
- 2014: 25.6%
- 2016: 30.5%

Corruption Pressure
Macedonia 2001 - 2016
Corruption trends 2001 - 2016

• Some improvement for the SEE region as a whole between 2001/2002 and 2014/2016

• Individual countries seldom show stable improvement over time.

• Decline in corruption pressure is typically followed by another increase with average levels of pressure remaining very high over a period of several years.

• What are the reasons for this pattern?
Feasibility of policy responses to corruption (%)

(% of the population 18+)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Corruption can not be substanially reduced</th>
<th>Corruption can be substanially reduced or eradicated</th>
<th>Don't know/No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Anticorruption policies and legislation

- **Macro level policies**
  - Principles of governance

- **National policies**
  - Standards (protocols) for the operation of the administration

- **Policies/measures at public organization level**
  - General and specific rules for operation in concrete situations

AC Policies - Corruption

CMS - MACPI officials - MACPI Clients
A12. Whenever you have contacted **officials** in the public sector, how often in the preceding year have they:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General population</th>
<th></th>
<th>Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A12A</td>
<td><strong>Directly demanded</strong> cash, gift or favor</td>
<td>A12A</td>
<td><strong>Directly offered</strong> something to you (money, gift, favour) in return for you doing some service for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A12B</td>
<td>Not demanded directly, but <strong>showed that they expected</strong> cash, gift or favor</td>
<td>A12B</td>
<td>Not offered directly, but <strong>showed that they would give</strong> something (cash, gift or favor) in return for you doing some service for them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In all cases</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>In isolated cases</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>In no cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In all cases</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In isolated cases</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>In no cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corruption Pressure, 2015
Bulgarian and Italian Public Organizations
Incidence rates reported by officials

- Traffic police, Bulgaria: 34%
- Slatina Municipality, Sofia, Bulgaria: 32%
- Burgas Municipality, Bulgaria: 25%
- General Labour Inspectorate, Bulgaria: 24%
- Border Police, Bulgaria: 17%
- Health Service of Trento, Italy: 14%
- Bulgarian Ministry of Defence: 14%
- Municipality of Riva del Garda, Italy: 6%
Monitoring Anti-Corruption in Europe
Bridging Policy Evaluation and Corruption Measurement
Rethinking corruption measurement and understanding why anticorruption policies don’t work

- Corruption decline is very slow in SEE and the reason is not the lack of anti-corruption legislation.
- Assessing, monitoring of AC policies and policy tools is important in order to understand corruption dynamics.
- Deep understanding of national-level AC policies requires studying and monitoring how these policies are implemented at the level of particular public organizations.
- We cannot really understand corruption without understanding the failure of anti-corruption in SEE.
Thank you!
Resilience to corruption pressure

(among those pressured into bribing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Bribed because pressured</th>
<th>% No answer</th>
<th>% Did not bribe, despite pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SELDI/CSD Corruption Monitoring System, 2016, base: respondents who experienced corruption pressure
Involvement in corruption with or without corruption pressure

(% of the population 18+, who have given a bribe with or without corruption pressure)

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Acceptability of corruption

(%) of the population 18+, who accept different forms of corrupt behaviour

- Albania: 54%
- Kosovo: 48%
- Macedonia: 47%
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 38%
- Turkey: 34%
- Serbia: 32%
- Montenegro: 25%
- Croatia: 25%
- Bulgaria: 20%

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Susceptibility to corruption

(% of the population 18+ that would give and/or accept a bribe in the role of citizen and/or official)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Susceptible to corruption</th>
<th>Mixed behavior</th>
<th>Not susceptible to corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, 2016
Key recommendations

Deliver effective prosecution of high-level corruption

- Sentencing of corrupt politicians from the top political echelon provides a strong example for everyone and have proven very effective in strengthening anti-corruption measures in Croatia and Slovenia.

Adopt an independent corruption and anti-corruption monitoring mechanism

- The mechanism should be implemented through national and/or regional civil society network(s), and should be independent of direct national government funding. It should serve as a vehicle for opening up administrative data collection and public access to information.

Anti-corruption efforts should be focused on critical sectors

- Energy, public procurement, corporate governance of state owned enterprises, large-scale investment projects.