“From Radicalisation to Terrorism: Can detectable patterns of behaviour help to determine potential risk?”

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My background

• Former Senior Research Leader, RAND Europe
  – Lead on terrorism & counter terrorism, insurgency & counter insurgency, 2006 to 2015

• PhD
  – Thesis (2002); Origins and evolution of terrorism & counter terrorism in the UK

• Former Detective Chief Inspector, New Scotland Yard, London
  – Specialist in terrorism and counter terrorism, 1982 - 2006
What is this presentation about?

• Examining the potential for current behaviour to be used to indicate possible future intentions
• Examining a selection of evidence for this from UK case studies, focused on violent jihadists terrorists (VJ)
• Putting the findings in a wider context
Preventing VJ Terrorism (1): Early phases in the development of radicalisation

- Non-radicalised population at large
- Increasing awareness, empathy & politicisation
- Increasing polarisation, development of an "us & them" mindset
- Radicalisation in thoughts and words is apparent to others... But to the individual it is not enough

...So some individuals take the decision to participate in VJ
What characterises these early phases?

• Predominantly they are:
  – Thoughts, words and/or “harmless” or “borderline” actions
  – Activity is mostly not unlawful, up to and including extremism
  – Necessity for State intervention can be difficult to justify

• Protected by the ECHR (up to a point):
  – Freedom of thought, conscience & religion (Article 9)
  – Freedom of expression (Article 10)
  – Freedom of assembly & association (Article 11)
Preventing VJ Terrorism (2): Final phases of radicalisation where VJ *actions* can transform into terrorist attacks

- **Active Transition to VJ**
- **Participation in VJ or training to do so** (Syria, Pakistan etc)
- **Return to country of origin or elsewhere**
- **Involvement in Terrorist Attack Planning & Preparations**
- **Participation in a Terrorist Attack**

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What characterises these final phases?

- Increasingly dominated by actions & behaviour of:
  - The individual
  - The group or cell they belong to
  - Individuals acting on behalf of a group or cell

- Increasing proportion of activity is illegal/criminal
  - The closer this is to an act of terrorism, the more of it will become unlawful

- Becomes easier to determine the level of commitment to violence (individual & group)

- There may be a direct leap from ‘Active Transition’ to ‘Terrorist Attack Planning & Preparations’ without any travel or training
...BEHAVIOURS in all these phases can be potential indicators of future intentions

• Is there any evidence to support this assertion?

• ‘Exploring Patterns of Behaviour in Violent Jihadist Terrorists: An analysis of six significant terrorist conspiracies in the UK’

  by

  Lindsay Clutterbuck and Richard Warnes, RAND TR-923-ANT, 2011

www.rand.org/publications
What research information was gathered?

• Analysis & comparison of the six most serious VJ attacks & conspiracies in the UK (2004 to 2007)
• Looked for:
  – “Characteristics” (x15) - of the group/cell and the individual i.e. age, background, numbers in group/cell
  – “Behaviours” (x54) – of the group/cell, the individual acting on behalf of the group and the individual generally)
  – Meta-data of individuals
• mm
What is the evidence base?

• The six UK case studies, 2004 – 2007
  – Operation CREVICE (fertiliser bomb)
  – Operation RHYME (VBIEDs as potential “dirty bombs”)
  – 7/7 suicide attacks (Underground x3 & bus x1, 52 killed)
  – 21/7 failed suicide attacks (Underground x5, no injuries)
  – Operation SEAGRAM attacks (Failed VBIED x2 in London & car conflagration suicide attack at Glasgow airport)
  – Operation OVERT (Suicide IEDs on up to 9 planes to USA)
• Looked at 38 individuals either killed in the attacks (5) or convicted of participating in them (38)
How was the information gathered and dealt with?

- Information was only gathered from *open sources*
- Information *categories* were created (derived from operational experience) and further relevant information was then sought
- The categories were *analysed and compared*
- The resulting information was *assessed* and conclusions drawn
What are the advantages of this approach?

- Uses modified *Grounded Theory*—conclusions are derived from real world findings, not trying to fit a pre-conceived hypothesis to the evidence
- *Flexible* and can be continually added to/updated/amended
- *Compares and contrasts* similarly-minded individuals, not against the general population
- Targets very specific and relevant *behaviours* (i.e. what their *actions* are), not aspects such as education, income etc
How can a behavioural approach assist us?

- Radicalisation is a dynamic, non-linear process over time and during it, the individual will change and their thoughts, words and actions (behaviour) will also change to reflect this:

- For example:
  - Noticeable changes in the pattern of behaviour seen in an individual may be indicative of the presence of the process of radicalisation, especially where they appear to have re-engaged with their heritage religion (Islam)

  – Individuals exhibiting a change from no or minimal religious observance to noticeable religious observance with their own ‘heritage’ religion i.e. Islam

- 34.2%
Primary behaviour can be driven by religious strictures

- Individuals whose lifestyle and behaviour in their recent past was *at odds with the strictures of Islam* e.g. they drink alcohol, took drugs, smoked tobacco, dated girls etc

- 23.7%

- Consequently, these individuals must have *STOPPED* drinking alcohol, taking drugs, smoking tobacco, dating girls etc .....
And there is more...

- ....Some of them also *STARTED* to become *noticeably religiously observant*
- Some of those who were already religiously observant *became even more so* – 21%
- Some *discarded western style dress* for clothing with religious significance – 28.9%
- Some *attended* external religious schools/activities or other, less formal religious “study circles” – 42.1%
What does this show?

• In other words, **changes in behaviour** were visible in some of those who went on to become involved in VJ.

• However, **we do not know** how many took these steps **but did not make the transition to VJ**.

• At least **two** are known (one from this study & one other) to have decided not to participate in terrorist attacks.
Are these findings valid over time?

Yes, they are, for example:

Arrests made in Birmingham, **September 2011**, convicted February 2013

- “The ringleaders...had travelled to Pakistan twice for training – on the second occasion spending two months at an AQ training facility in north Waziristan. They were recruited... and on their return began to draw others into the plot.”

- Plus other relevant factors:
  - Leaders previously trained together in Pakistan (March 2009)
  - Fraudulently raising money for charity to finance their activity (involvement in crime)
  - Selected others to be trained and then facilitated their trip to Pakistan
  - Recorded ‘suicide messages’ when in Pakistan for AQ to use after the attacks

But their **Modus Operandi (MO) today has also changed and evolved:**

- e.g. today the role of physical contact in radicalisation& recruitment is much reduced, while the use of P2P contact has increased greatly
- Syria (and to a much lesser extent Somalia) have become the destinations of choice for potential VJ
What conclusions can be drawn?(1)

• All but one of attacks and conspiracies seen in the UK between 2004 and 2007 (at least) tended to follow a common trajectory

• The phases began with Radicalization, moved on to Transition to VJ and progressed into planning and preparations for one or more terrorist attacks

• The catalysts for this process were one or two individuals in each group/cell who already had links to an existing terrorist movement (Al Qaeda) and who had been selected/trained by them in Pakistan to return to the UK to plan and carry out terrorist attacks
What conclusions can be drawn?

• During each of these phases, individuals showed particular behaviours, some of which were indicative of what stage of the attack cycle was then underway.

• However, it is, at best, a proof of concept. It is not a fully developed and validated methodology.

• More, country-specific research is required....
Any Questions?

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