Developing working methods in monitoring radicalisation trends and risks

Rositsa Dzhekova
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Gaps and needs in radicalisation monitoring

- No systematic collection and analysis of statistical data related to extremist crimes and perpetrators
- Limited understanding of root causes, factors and manifestations of radicalisation
- Little knowledge of who is vulnerable and to what extent, and how to identify vulnerability early on
- Limited or lacking prevention measures - need to be based on better evidence
- Need to engage wider array of stakeholders in counter-radicalisation (public sector bodies, civil society, communities) - raising their awareness of relevant risks is key
Objectives and aims

• Provide a methodology for drafting an annual situation report on trends and threats of violent radicalisation/extremism

• Designing a tailor-made national risk assessment methodology for identifying, monitoring and evaluating manifestations and risk indicators of radicalisation

• Enable relevant authorities to:
  • use appropriate risk indicators for analysis of radicalisation phenomena;
  • monitor trends in a systematic manner
Definitions of radicalisation

- **Radicalisation** is the process by which individuals come to hold or embrace radical views in relation to the status quo / adopt an extremist belief system.

- **Violent radicalisation** is a process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts, incl. terrorism to attain the stated goal / as a method to effect societal change.
Understanding radicalisation processes

ROOT CAUSES, DRIVERS AND FACTORS OF RADICALISATION

Individual vulnerability (push factors)
Interaction with radicalisation setting (pull factors)
Situational factors: background conditions; trigger events

RADICALISATION PROCESS

MANIFESTATIONS

Behaviour (violent/non-violent)
Attitudes, beliefs
Identity changes
Appearance changes

OBSERVABLE AND MEASURABLE INDICATORS
Monitoring radicalisation trends and risks

**Extremist activity**
- Spread, trends and threats of extremism-related violence (criminal statistics, event data, intelligence data)

**Moving towards extremism**
- Risk indicators signalling potential radicalisation (risk behaviour, change in appearance, events, attitudes)

**Vulnerable individuals and groups**
- Processes of social polarisation vs cohesion, social tensions, conflicts (surveys, opinion polls, macro statistics)

**Wider community/society**

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**Annual situational report on extremist trends**

**Risk assessment methodology** (first line practitioners)
Developing a template for a situational report on extremism (1)

- **Criminal statistics, open source data**
  - Spread, nature and trends in violent radicalism, extremism and terrorism
    - Extremist/terrorist crimes
    - Extremist/terrorist perpetrators
    - Event data (protests, marches, concerts)

- **Strategic intelligence analysis, threat assessment**
  - Threat posed by extremist/terrorist actors
    - activities, structure, members, spread
    - ideology, strategy, tactics
    - influence, fundraising and recruitment
    - capability and intent to cause harm
Extremist/hate crimes in Bulgaria

Serious bodily injury with hooligan, racist or xenophobic motives (Art. 131, Par. 1, It.12, CC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pre-trial proceedings</th>
<th>Indictments</th>
<th>Persons indicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (Jan-Jun)</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Situational report (2): criminal acts and perpetrators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Criminal offences (extremism and violent radicalism) | Number of crimes recorded, crimes cleared up, persons prosecuted, region, verdicts (for each crime as per Criminal Code), regional variations, trends over time  
- Hate crimes (offences motivated by hatred against Roma, Muslims; motivated by homophobia; anti-Semitic)  
- Crimes against the state / terrorism  
- Crimes with anti-democratic motive  
- Crimes against religious denominations | Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor’s Office, Courts                                                                                                            |
| Perpetrators of extremist criminal offences    | - Socio-demographic and socio-economic profile (age, gender, occupation, education)  
- Type of crime committed / charged with  
- Criminal record (clear/investigated in the past/recidivists)  
- Weapon possession (proportion between overall legal weapon possession and perpetrators of extremist crimes who have obtained weapons legally) | Criminal statistics surveys  
Media monitoring  
Open source data                                                            |
# Situational report (3): threat assessment template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Source of information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Actors:** organisation, groups, movements (terrorist, extremist)** | - Structure and organisation  
- Membership base  
- Leadership  
- Resources and channels of financing  
- Areas of operation  
- Ideology/grievances/motivation  
- Strategy/tactics/mode of operation  
- Major activities (violent/non-violent) and targets  
- Legal status (bans)  
- Recruitment and propaganda  
- Media reach (magazines, blogs, social media)  
- Links and cooperation with other/foreign extremist groups (strategic, tactical and structural similarities and differences)  
- Criminal activity  
- Confrontational potential | **Sources:**  
Mol  
Intelligence services  
Media, internet  
Interviews with supporters and former members |
| **Type of analysis:** | Qualitative and quantitative analysis, Strategic intelligence assessment of capability and intent |
Risk assessment by first-line officers

- **Community police** can spot and record facts, detect behaviour, observe different processes, events and other related to potential radicalisation risks.

- Need to develop clear, objective, detectable, measurable **risk indicators** of radicalisation that can be monitored on a regular basis.

- Observable indicators for first-line officers used across the EU/US fall in the following categories: **behaviour, appearance, cognitive factors** (identity, ideology, attitudes)

- Not all of these can be recognised/observed by police – we need also **other methods and sources** (other frontline practitioners or sociological researchers).
UK (‘Channel’ approach) – 3 categories of 22 vulnerability indicators (focus on violence)

1. Engagement with a group, cause or ideology
   - Spending time with other extremists; changing style and looks to match group; behaviour centred around group, cause, ideology; loss of other interests
   - Possession of ideological materials, symbols; attempts to recruit

2. Intent to cause harm
   - Identifying a group as threat, blaming, labelling
   - Speaking of importance of action now, imminence of harm from a hostile group; *justifying offending* in the name of a cause, ideology; *supporting violence or harm*; plotting and conspiring

3. Capability to cause harm
   - History of violence, criminally versatile
   - Skills potentially supportive of terrorism (engineering, IT, chemicals, military training)
   - Access to networks, funding, equipment
FRANCE: warning signs and indicators for risk assessment

- Disruption with family, isolation
- Disruption with old friends
- Disruption with school
- New behaviours
- Behaviour and identity changes
- Withdrawal
- Sudden and exclusive interest for a religion or an ideology
- Relation with Internet and social networks: Consumption of sites with a radical or extremist nature

Two questionnaires with indicators distributed to National Police:
- for first-line officers (basic)
- for territorial intelligence services (detailed)
COPPRA – guide for first-line police officers on risk indicators

- Indicators of radicalisation processes being underway: identity, ideology, behavior
  - Changing names, clothing, physical appearance (beard etc), tattoos
  - Contact with extremist groups, possess propaganda material, secret meetings, change in religious practices
  - Glorification of martyrdom and violence, travel patterns, becoming outspoken with an extremist viewpoint, radical demonstrations
  - Social isolation, changed attitude towards others, minor crimes
- Indicators for preparation of terrorist activity: residence, transport, currency, (forged) documents, objects, preparation
Risk indicators Islamist radicalisation: community/group level

**TRIGGERS:**
- Social, religious, ethnic conflicts and tensions
- Extremist rhetoric by (right-wing) politicians
- Repressive measures by authorities (demolishing illegal housing/mosques, arrests, refusal of social benefits, legal bans on religious freedoms)
- Media
- Terrorist acts in the vicinity or abroad

**RED FLAGS:** Military and combat training provision in area; contact/support for foreign fighters in transit; spread of propaganda glorifying violence; demonstrating allegiance with terrorist/extremists groups and causes

**BEHAVIOURAL:** growing number of converts, people with religious education in Middle East; noticeable changes in appearances/religious practice; foreign emissaries in locality; Salafi charities; informal mosques; strikes, protests

**COGNITIVE:** hate speech by community leaders, voicing grievances, discontent, disrespect for (secular) authorities

**BACKGROUND CONDITIONS:** Socio-economic problems, encapsulation, weak moderate Muslim leaders, contested religious leadership, crime rates, in-group conflicts
Risk indicators Islamist radicalisation: individual level

**TRIGGERS:**
- Personal trauma or crisis
- Victimization or conflict
- Contact with recruiters
- Perception of international or domestic events (e.g. Syria)

**RED FLAGS:**
- Travel to risk countries/conflict zones;
- Contacts with radical groups;
- Literature on military training or making explosives;
- Received combat training;
- Buying weapons, explosives, forged docs;
- Criminal activity;
- Death or revenge rhetoric

**BEHAVIOURAL:**
- Convert or religious education abroad;
- Sudden change in appearance (dress, grooming) and religious practices;
- Cutting ties with family and friends;
- Engaging with extremist websites and literature;
- Forcing religious beliefs on others

**COGNITIVE:**
- Openly voicing grievances, glorifying violence,
- Attitudes against an expressed target;
- Voicing support for terrorist organisations and causes;
- Dichotomous worldview (us vs. them);
- Dissatisfaction with religious leaders

**BACKGROUND CONDITIONS:**
- Psychological problems, history of violence;
- Criminally versatile; prison experience;
- Relevant skills (IT, chemicals, weapons);
- Addictions;
- Family problems;
- Financial problems;
- Education and employment situation
Challenges and questions

- The risk assessment tool cannot measure risk with certainty – but aid professional judgement
- Community police are no intelligence officers - need proper training
- How can the monitoring be integrated into police daily work?
- Risk of misinterpretation and misuse of information
- Risk of alienating target communities through increased surveillance
- Should not be used as a surveillance tool for initiating legal charges / repressive measures
- Does not include a referral mechanism for institutional response to intervention needs
- Information should be centralised and analysed by experts / trained analysts to draft meaningful policy recommendations
Challenges and questions (2)

- Need to test which of indicators are adequate, observable and measurable by **frontline practitioners**
- A system for **weighting** different indicators as per the level of risk in the local context is required
- Need to develop **detailed guide and manual** for police officers on how to detect risk indicators (questionnaires, protocols), as well as for those who will analyze and interpret the data
- An **institutional mechanism** for implementation of the monitoring tool is essential
- Need for a **coordination mechanism at local level** for responding to risks identified – multiple stakeholders engagement
THANK YOU

rositsa.dzhekova@csd.bg

www.csd.bg